Part I. Nineteenth- And Twentieth Century Background by Bochner, Salomon
P A R T  I 
NINETEENTH- AND 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY BACKGROUND 
In 1803 the Reverend Samuel Miller, Trustee of Princeton University, 
published a Brief Retrospect of'rhe Eighteenrh Cenrto:~, that, even though an 
intended second volume never appeared, was anything but brief. In the 
judgment of the critic Gilbert Chinard, Miller's survey found that the 
eighteenth century was, among other things, "the age of literary honors and 
of international memberships in learned societies, and the age of Iiterary and 
scientific intercourse, for while in all preceding ages literary men were in 
great measure 'insulated,' increased facilities in transportation have enabled 
them to travel and to  communicate freely."' Our own retrospect of the 
nineteenth century will indeed be very brief. It will begin with pointing out 
how incomparably t17ore innovative travel and communication since 1800 
have become, and what the consequences of this have been; and this will set 
the tone for much that will follow. 
1 .  TRANSPORTATION. COMMUNICATION, ILLUMINATION 
When in 18 I2 Napoleon and his grar7c/e art176e set out to  conquer Russia, 
their basic mode of travel was the same as that of Caesar and his legions when 
setting out to conquer Gaul: on foot, on horseback, and in wagons. By now 
the horses had shoes, the riders had spurs, and some of the wagons were 
spring-cushioned coaches. But horse-drawn vehicles they were. And when 
retreating from General Kutusov, Napoleon traveled the same way as Darius 
when fleeing from Alexander the Great. Also, Napoleon's overland postal 
service was not much different from Darius'. For  urgent pithy messages he 
might have conceivably still used beacons of fire as did Aeschylus in his 
Agatnernnon. Papal conclaves are still signaling by columns of smoke. 
But in the middle of the nineteenth century the American Civil War was 
suddenly fought by railroad and Morse telegraph; at the end of the (extended) 
century, in World War I, military planes met in dogfights; and already, years 
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before, there were wireless communications ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship, 
After that, the twentieth century made transport by plane and communica- 
tion by satellite a way of life. 
In the wake of such strides in transportation, the nineteenth century did 
not limit itself to the creation of "learned" societies for a "select" few a s  
Samuel Miller boasted for the eighteenth century, but there sprang up, all 
over, various academic and professional societies, whose membership com- 
prised all those engaged in a certain kind of activity. Societies like these began 
to hold annual, o r  even more frequent, meetings to which the total member- 
ship was invited; and, very significantly, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, international congresses for ever-larger numbers of participants 
began to be organized, sometimes with telling results. For instance, in 1904 
Henri Poincari: proclaimed his Relativity Principle not in Paris, where he 
was domiciled, o r  even in France, or even in Europe, but in the U.S.A., a t  the 
World's Fair in St. Louis, at something called the International Congress for 
Arts and Sciences. 
In the twentieth century, scientific meetings and conferences-local, 
regional, national, and international-have become a rage, and scientific 
collaboration, even outright research collaboration, by long-distance telephone 
is a common occurrence. 
Furthermore, the history of the rise of Socialism, Communism, Nihilism, 
and Anarchy in the nineteenth century is replete with accounts of various travels 
of partisans, either among themselves or to formal gatherings. These travels 
became increasingly frequent as the century progressed, and "Internationals" 
and "Congresses" proliferated. Karl Marx made his true debut in 1864, at a 
meeting of the so-called First International, whose full name was The Inter- 
national Working Men's Association. It was set up in London in 1864, began 
as a joint affair of the British and French Trade Unions, and subsequently 
organized Congresses, Conferences, and Sections in various European cities 
like London, Geneva, Lausanne, Brussels, and the ~ a ~ u e . '  Marx and Marxism 
would hardly have come to  influence and power without these propagandistic 
outlets. 
The crowning event of "The Rise of Communism by Travel Facilities" 
came in 1917, during World War I, when Germany's General Erich Ludendorff 
outwitted himself monumentally by transporting Lenin from Switzerland to 
Leningrad, then St. Petersburg, in a sealed railroad car right across Germany, 
with the avowed aim of overthrowing the czarist regime. 
In the twentieth century ease of travel has vulgarized life, Even before 1890, 
Jane Harrison, author of Prolegomena 10 the Stud,' of' Creek Religion (l903), 
an  academic nurse to  a generation of lustrous classicists, braved great diffi- 
culties when going to Athens for topographic studies of its ancient precinct 
and for visiting the birthplace of Zeus in a cave of the lonely island of Crete. 
Nowadays these places are overrun by organized tourist groups. The Tahiti 
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of today is not the Tahiti of Matisse. And an  American, fleeing a n  island off 
New England for an island off Spain, winds up with the same Coca Cola 
bottle in hand. 
Quick travel and communication call for adequate nighttime illumination, 
and it was an important modernism when in 1784 Aim6 Argand put a glass 
chimney around the wick of the oil lamp.' Nevertheless, in its beginning, the 
nineteenth century was still very close to  age-old candlelight, flickering as 
ever. Balzac (1799-1850), for instance, wrote still by candlelight, working 
through many a long night. But the century spent most of its productive years 
by cheerful kerosene lamps and ever-shining gas burners, and many bulky 
scholarly works bear the hallmark of this effective innovation. 
It is surprising to find, day in and day out, how many of these nineteenth- 
century "gaslight" works either d o  not have any adequate successor works in 
the twentieth century, or, a t  least, refuse to be superseded by them; and so 
they have to  be reprinted, in ever increasing numbers, for  active research and 
reference activities. There are very few reference books in continuing use that 
were written before 1800, but astonishingly many from the nineteenth century 
are still flourishing. Moritz Cantor's voluminous Histoy> qJ'Mathen7atics is 
a reference work in active use, and so is Eduard Zeller's comprehensive 
Historj7 of Greek Philosoph,~~. In 1874 Alexander Schmidt, a sickly Prussian 
schoolmaster in Koenigsberg, who apparently had never set foot in an English- 
speaking land, compiled a Shakespeare dictionary that is still on American 
reference shelves. The British "Liddell-Scott," in an up-dating, is the dictionary 
of classical Greek all over the world. Emile Littrk compiled not only his 
renowned Dicrionnaire de /a langue fiancaise, but, being a physician by 
training, he alsocompiled an indispensible many-volume edition of the Greek 
Hippocratic corpus, with translation, commentary, and essays. With all that, 
he also spread the gospel of Auguste Comte's positivism among "machine" 
politicians, making himself one of them. The grand Oxfbrd English Dictionary 
appeared. And there is always the eleventh edition of the Encj~cloyedia 
Britannic*~ (191 I), challenging anybody to dare turn it to pulp with which to  
produce a would-be better edition of the work. 
In the twentieth century, many-volumed academic works, scientific and 
humanistic, tend to  become "corporate" o r  "collective," that is, to become 
collections of contributions by soi-disanf specialists. In the sciences, physical 
and social, even research work and its publication are done with increasing 
frequency by two o r  more authors jointly. In the nineteenth century people 
were clannish and socially gregarious, but did '*brain work"individually, by 
themselves. In the twentieth century they are members of Margaret Mead's 
nuclear family and David Riesner's lonely crowd, but d o  their brain work 
jointly. 
In consequence of this development, standards for originality of achieve- 
ment by a n  individual may become harder to  apply. Einstein himself became 
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involved in a minor identity problem resultingfromjoint authorship. Around 
I9 13, on the road t o  the theory of general relativity, he and the mathematician 
Marcel Grossmann had written a few joint papers on the mathematics that 
was prerequisite for the eventual theory. It is reported that in later years 
Einstein insisted that the joint work was only a convenience t o  him, and that 
he could have managed without it. 
Jointly authored research in mathematics, physics, and other sciences 
began to multiply after the late Victorian era, and it frequently came into being 
in rhe coffee houses in which academics congregated. Europe before World 
War I was a vast peninsula of the Eurasian landmass teeming with coffee 
houses. Mathematicians, for instance, did agood deal ofjoint work there, but 
some others did not. Jean Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, the longest- 
surviving fossils of the coffee-house era, have not been known to  cooperate 
literally, either between themselves or with others. 
2. T H E  A G E  OF T H E  E A R T H  A N D  OF T H E  UNIVERSE 
A drastic change of outlook between the two ends of the nineteenth century 
took place with regard to the age of the earth, affecting the questions of the 
chronology of the earth and of the scientific standing of the Biblical account 
of creation as given in Genesis. 
Around A D 1800, it was still presumed that the time that had elapsed since 
the last flood, Noah's Flood-the occurrence of which, in one form or another, 
was somehow taken for granted-was around six thousand years, as implied in 
the Biblical account that had been composed around 700 B c 4  It was already 
taken for granted, though, by church fathers and their Jewish counterparts, 
that creation itself had taken place appreciably earlier, the six days of creation 
having been six epochs of events and not just six days in our conventional 
sense. Even so, around 1800 the totalage of the earth was nor thought to be 
very great. The last generally known chronological enumeration before 1800 
had been made in 1778, in Georges de Buffon's Epochsof Nature, in which he 
distinguished several epochs: from the creation of the earth as a hot nebula t o  
its consolidation, hence to  its cooling-off, hence t o  the beginning of organic 
life, hence to the creation of man, and hence t o  the present. With all these 
various epochs to  account for, the total age of the earth ran only into one 
hundred thousand years or so.5 
But a t  the other end of the century, in 1906, a calculation was made by 
which the age of the earth was estimated to be a t  least a hilliot7 years old. 
Radioactive decay was a recent discovery then; and the physicist B. B. Boltwood, 
an exceedingly quiet American, was apparently the first to suggest, in corre- 
spondence with Ernest Rutherford, that theelement lead in the earth had arisen 
by decay from uranium. At least a billion years would have been needed for the 
total process to come about; Boltwood thus hinted indirectly at a minimum age 
for the earth.h 
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Between Buffon and Boltwood there were of course estimates running into 
millions of years "only." The first paragraph of the National Research 
Council's study, "The Age of the Earth," runs thus: 
At the b e g ~ n n ~ n g  of the present century the problem of the age of the Earth wasenv~saged 
as reou~rine the reconc~l~a t~on  of three ~ n d e ~ e n d e n t  estimates. all of the same order of 
. - 
magn~tude These estimates were G. H. Darw~n's, of 57 m~llion years. based on the separa- 
tlon of the moon from the earth; Lord Kelv~n's. of 20-40 m ~ l l ~ o n s ,  based on the secular 
cool~ng of the globe. and Joly's. of 80-90 m ~ l l ~ o n s ,  based on the rate of accumulation of 
s o d ~ u m  In the world-ocean T o  these should beadded Helmholt7's estlmate of 22 m ~ l l ~ o n  
years. based on the source of the bun3 heat and ~ t s  probable dura t~on  
These intermediate estimates came very late in the nineteenth century, in 
the last third of it, and apparently only after the publication of Charles Darwin's 
Origin ofspecies.  This work finally liberated the average scientist from the 
necessity of comparing the scientific account of the age of the universe with 
the Biblical one. Until then, the geologist somehow had t o  take a stand with 
regard to the Biblical account, and it was moreadmissible to oppose it than to 
ignore it. The requirement that science be answerable to religion was one of 
the longest-lasting survivals of antiquity into modern times. The nineteenth 
century finally succeeded in loosening scientific ties to theology that the 
Renaissance, and even the mighty Scientific Revolution after it, had not. 
Since Darwin's Origin, anybody who still considered himself scientifically 
accountable to  the Bible has been called a Fundamentalist. 
Helmholtz, and also some of the others, were wondering not only how old 
the earth is, but also how long life on it, which obviously depends on a steady 
supply of heat, is likely to  continue. Buffon had already madean estimate. He 
greatly underestimated the heat coming from the sun, and took into account 
mainly the heat that reaches the habitable earth by propagation from the hot 
center of the earth. This is little enough. In addition to that, Buffon's calcula- 
tions, which came before J. Fourier's great treatise on the propagation of 
heat, were inexpert. Even from his own premises, Buffon's estimate for the 
future of life on earth was shorter than it might have been. 
Helmholtz and his contemporaries knew, of course, that the energy 
reaching us from the sun is the decisive figure in the calculations, and the 
question before them was how the sun's heat can maintain itself, and for how 
long. Only two large-scale sources for production of heat suggested them- 
selves to them, chemical combustion and mechanical motion. They examined 
both, the mechanical motion being that of the sun itself, of meteorites, and 
of other cosmic matter attracted by the sun. Their hypotheses allowed for 
millions of years only, both in the past and for the future life of the earth,'but 
paleontological and related estimates called for billions of years instead. 
The microphysics of the twentieth century finally brought relief. Close to 
1940 it was suggested that the production of energy in the sun is an atomic 
process converting hydrogen into helium; such a process does allow for 
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billions of years, past and future. A great irritant of the nineteenth century 
was removed. 
Otherwise, the twentieth century has raised Boltwood's estimate of over a 
billion years for the age of the earth to several billion, which is not much of a 
change, and big-bang theories of creation have assessed the age of the universe 
to be ten to fifteen billion years. 
The preceding account owes much to a conversation with the Rice geologist 
John Allan Stewart Adams. 
3. P R O B I N G  T H E  G A L A C T I C  UNIVERSE 
William Herschel in the eighteenth century felt that all the pursuit of 
astronomy required was bigger and better telescopes, and still in 1857, G. F. 
Bond of Harvard opined "that it was simply a matter of finding one o r  two 
hundred thousand  dollar^."^ Actual developments proved the problem was 
not so simple. 
The nineteenth century created s p e ~ t r o s c o ~ ~ "  and laid the foundation for 
radio astronomy. These are powerful searchlights for the exploration of the 
telescopic depth of the universe that had been bared in Galilee's Srai? 
Messeng~r. The nineteenth century readied both devices, and began to test 
spectroscopy seriously. The twentieth century has been developing and using 
both of them to the hilt. They complement each other to such an extent that 
radio-astronomy is forgiven if, somewhat irreverently, it has taken to  calling 
its "big dish" a radio-telescope. 
These devices derive their power from living on Maxwell's vast electro- 
magnetic spectrum that stretches from frequency 0 t o  frequency a -a  dis- 
covery that was as great a hallmark of the Victorian Age as any. Spectroscopy 
resides in the visible part of the spectrum, Newton's domain, and radio waves 
emanate from its nethermost part, the realm of Heinrich Hertz. The upper- 
most part is also sending messages, unsolicited ones, via cosmic rays, but 
they have not yet been unscrambled. 
Spectroscopy can identify the composition of matter, say its chemical 
composition on earth, in the solar system, and anywhere beyond. That is, it 
can say what stars are made of in defiance of Auguste Comte's obilei ~/ ic /~ im,  
"the field of positive philosophy lies wholly within the limits of our solar 
system, the study of the universe being inaccessible in any positive sense.""' 
The discoveries came about gradually at first, then the pace quickened. The 
eighteenth century was in awe of Newton's spectral resolution of sunlight, but 
did nothing to  continue the work. Punctually in 1800, however, William 
Herschel discovered the infrared; in 1801 J. W. Ritter discovered the ultra- 
violet; and in 1802 Wollaston was the first to discover in Newton's spectrum 
certain dark lines in fixed positions, the so-called Fraunhofer lines." 
Spectra, and thin lines in the spectra-the lines being sometimes dark and 
sometimes bright-can be produced by letting any kind of light, from any 
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luminous source, terrestrial o r  celestial, pass through a crystal. It was soon 
sensed, however inarticulately at  first, that the coloration of the spectra and 
the lines in them, especially the latter, transmit information about the 
chemistry of the light sources and of the media that the light traverses before 
reaching the refractive crystals. This is what spectroscopy is all about. 
A first high point was reached around 1860 by Gustav R. Kirchhoff, partly 
in collaboration with R. W. Bunsen. Gathering up preceding developments, 
he greatly emphasized the possibility of applications "to the chemistry and 
structure of the suns and stars. His treatment was more complete than that of 
any of his predecessors, and made a much greater impression a t  the time on 
the scientific world."" Acting on this precept, the British astronomer William 
Huggins decided in 186314 that  certain nebulae, which until then (that is, by 
mere telescopic examination) were deemed indistinguishable, were partly 
clusters of stars and partly luminous gas." 
The creation of the chemistry of celestial matter was only half of what 
spectroscopy contributed to the comprehension and exploration of the 
universe. Another half has come about in the way I will elaborate next, and it 
was again Huggins who was in the vanguard of developments. 
By the time J .  von Fraunhofer examined his Iines in 1815, there was a 
general acceptance of the undulatory theory of light of Thomas Young. It was 
part of Young's theory that the length of the wave varies with the color of the 
light, increasing from violet to red, and Fraunhofer gave precise figures for 
the waves of his lines. In 1841 the Austrian physicist Christian Doppler 
announced the principle-now generally known by his name-that i fa  source 
of light, or  of any other wave of the same mathematical structure, is in motion 
relative to a n  observer, then the period of the waves as received by the observer 
will be different from the period of the waves as emitted by the source: if the 
source moves away from the observer the wave becomes longer, if it moves 
towards the observer the wave becomes shorter. Also, soon after Doppler's 
work, "the French physicist Armand Hippolyte Louis Fizeau pointed out that 
t o  detect the [Doppler-] effect in light, one should not worry about overall 
color, but should measure the exact position of the spectral lines and note 
their ~ h i f t . " ' ~  Here again Huggins scored a first. In 1868 he was able to detect 
a small shift in the spectral lines of the bright star Sirius and to show that it is 
moving away from the sun. His figures for the velocity of relative motion were 
not right, largely because he could train his telescope on the star only visually 
and not yet photographically. Eventually he pioneered in attaching a photo- 
graphic lens too. 
What Huggins observed in 1868 in the spectrum of Sirius is nowadays 
called a "red shift"; and this phenomenon and Huggins's conclusion from it 
were only small tokens of a big thing to come in the twentieth century. Edwin 
Powell Hubble and others trained huge telescopes equipped with the latest 
spectroscopic devices on  distant nebulae and galaxies outside our own, and 
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the red shift was observed everywhere and any time. Thus the conclusion 
imposed itself that our universe as a whole is expanding, and this momentous 
insight of the twentieth century harks back to something that first happened 
in the 1850s and the 1860s, in the works of Kirchhoff and Huggins. 
Even before Hubble's astronomical discoveries, Albert Einstein had 
encountered the possibility of an  expanding universe from purely theoretical 
considerations and found it puzzling. Hubble's observational confirmation 
was welcome, but a philosophical sense of wonderment lingers on. 
Radio astronomy is largely a creation of the twentieth century. But an  
attempt, even if a n  abortive one, to detect soIar waves was madearound 1890 
by the English physicist Oliver Joseph Lodge (1851-1940), a pioneer in radio 
co rnmunica t i~n .~ '  
4. SPACE AKD STRUCTURE 
What follows is less spectacular but more substantive than what has 
preceded. 
"Everybody" knows that in the early nineteenth century a n  age-wrinkled 
Euclidean geometry passed scepter and diadem to  the young and promising 
non-Euclidean geometry of Bolyai-Lobachevsky. No revisionist historian can 
gainsay this, but I venture to  qualify it. 
The horse-drawn vehicles of Napoleon, which I mentioned in section I ,  
were not the same as those of Julius Caesar, except that horse-drawn they 
remained. S o  also, the Euclidean geometry of Gauss, Monge, and Poncelet in 
the beginning of the nineteenth century was not the same as that of Euclid, 
Archimedes, and Apollonius in the third century B C  But recognizably 
Euclidean it remained, until Bolyai and Lobachevsky made it recognizably 
non-Euclidean. 
Theirs was only a first start on the road to a new geometry. Nowadays 
geometry-at-large, especially the geometry in science, is something that 
happens in space, and space is something for geometry to live in. But it was 
not s o  for Bolyai and Lobachevsky. For them, a s  for Euclid, geometry was 
something to house axioms (and postulates), and axioms were something on 
which t o  erect geometry. Still, in the end, something very avant-garde came 
of it. 
The second start came when, in the middle of the nineteenth century, 
Bernhard Riemann, ignoring Bolyai-Lobachevsky, introduced a general 
Hausdorff manifold as an underlying variety; and this being given, he imposed 
on it a certain geometric structure, named "Riemannian metric (or structure)" 
after him. It cannot be over-emphasized that the generality of the underlying 
variety upon which the geometrical structure is imposed is of the essence. It is 
this that first begat Einstein's General Relativity and Cosmology and still 
lures the masses to  him. In the case of Bolyai-Lobachevsky the underlying 
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variety remained the same, namely a Euclidean expanse, and only the imposed 
structure was different; Einstein hardly used it. 
Like all great art, Riemann's constructs are "representational"and "abstract" 
at once. They are representational as intuited, but are swaddled in a layer of 
mathematics that makes them appear to be abstract. And they are indeed so 
only by appearance. It is this fusion of representation and abstraction that 
appeals to the "sophisticates" of our day, be they ever so  defiantly apologetic 
about not understanding the mathematics of it at  all. 
The geometrical axiomatization u la Bolyai-Lobachevsky can also be 
updated and refined, as we will see. But in comparison with Riemann's vertical 
edifices, it leads to a vast flatness of abstraction, both monotonous and 
productive, as flatlands can be. 
In order to  grasp what the nineteenth century did in this matter, and then 
what the twentieth century made ofi t ,  we must go back to the Greeks; go back 
to  them and accuse them of having brought forth the most freakish kind of 
geometry possible (freakish from our  retrospect, of course). When compared 
to  Riemann's geometry, they had nothing "structural," not only no overall 
Space Structure, but even no underlying so-called Euclidean Space, on which 
conceivably to erect a structure. As I havestated repeatedly before," nowhere 
in their thinking did the Greeks have a background space-that is, a Euclidean 
 or E'-as a mathematical object in its own right, priorto configurations to 
place in it. For instance, it is unthinkable to find a record of Archimedes 
having given a lecture o n  "Some properties of Space." Ptolemy did not use 
the concept either. A planetary path of his was of course lying in his cosmos, 
and a grand conception it was, but as a mathematical construct it was lying in 
some kind of indistinct metaphysical Nowhere. This continued throughout 
the Middle Ages. Although there was an  adumbration of background space 
in the work of Nicholas of Cusa in the first half of the fifteenth century, the 
concept was still lacking in the thought patterns of Copernicus in the first half 
of the sixteenth century. Concurrently, there was no mathematically oriented 
theory of gravitation put forward during that long stretch of time. 
A break did finally come, a t  the very end of the Renaissance in the first 
years of the seventeenth century, and the protagonist was Johannes Kepler. 
Suddenly and imperiously he introduced mathematical background space 
into science-any science-and, in effect, into cognition at  large, mathe- 
matical and other. I have first stated and elaborated this in detail for  the case 
of astronomy and cosmology," and afterwards for virtually all of mathe- 
matics." 1 hope eventually to gather up  all Kepler's achievements into one 
portmanteau, even his explanation of the retinal image of human vision that 
is second only to his planetary laws, his pride of prides. 
Kepler's planetary laws formed half or  even two-thirds of Newton's law of 
gravitation. I would even say nine-tenths of gravitation, if Kepler had derived 
the laws tolerably well. But he did not. As it was, he only half-guessed them, 
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and Newton after him had to provide a derivation. In the context of the 
derivation, in the Prrnc.ipiu as a whole, Newton imposed on Euclidean Space 
a certain structure, nowadays called aNit7e structure, by making the space the 
carrier, at  each point. of a vector field, by which to identify velocities, 
momenta, and  force^.'^ Before Newton, Galileo, for all the innovations of his 
Srart:~, Messenger, made no contribution to the creation of mathematical 
background space. Therefore, his gravitational findings are only terrestrial, 
and his pro-Copernicus argument requires the lengthy Dialog~ie Conc.err7itig 
rhr ' T i t 7 0  Cliief' Worlcl Sj,siet?is of his most mature years, whereas Kepler got 
his justification of Copernicus out of the way in his slim post-graduate 
Cornlograph ic Mj'5 r e y .  
Descartes, between Kepler and Newton, imposed on Euclidean Space a 
structure prerequisite for the unfolding of Analysis through symbolism and 
infinitesimal calculus. He himself contributed more to the establishment of 
the method than to its unfolding; uncannily he made his Lu GPotneirie an 
integral part of his Disco~crs de leu t77Prho~/e. AS will be emphasized in Part 11, 
in the context of gravitation, this "method" went into action well over a 
century after Newton, in the work of S. D. Poisson a t  the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Poisson firmly introduced the gravitational potential 
that changed gravitation from a distance action into a proximity action. After 
another century this insight of Poisson's guided Einstein through the Rieman- 
nian maze towards the goal of a gravitation of his own. 
Aristotle insists that everything in Nature and Knowledge runs in contrasts 
and contrarieties. In addition to the vertically cresting space category of 
Riemann, we have, by contrast, the horizontally undulating space of Georg 
Cantor, of set theory fame, who was led t o  generalize the traditional concept 
of space until it extenuated into being a general "point set," that is, a general 
(Cantorian) aggregate, the elements of which are viewed as "points." This 
conception penetrated into all of mathematics. But it also had a great attrac- 
tion for  the "axiomatics" that was a n  end-product of Bolyai-Lobachevsky 
developments, and for the mathematical logic of the Boolean algebra type, 
also a creation of the nineteenth century. This novel context of mathemat~cal 
science is the "flatland" previously alluded to.  
It is a vast savannah, and it must be vast because it is the breeding and 
nurturing ground of all the automation, computerization, containerization, 
etc., that is engulfing us ever more pervasively, changing ever more rapidly 
by the week, day, and hour. Air conditioning, Xeroxing, even food packaging 
-they are all domiciled on the same twentieth-century flatland, with Henry 
Ford's assembly line being perhaps in the vanguard; and artifacts like 
refrigerators, freezers, and washing machines also occupy a corner of it. 
There were harbingers of these modern innovations in the nineteenth 
century, such as standardizing of clothes, shoes, etc., t o  fit various customers, 
rather than having them custom-made individually. Thus the department 
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store is in a sense only a nineteenth-century forerunner of the twentieth- 
century supermarket and superdrugstore, which now flourish with it, side by 
side. 
The contrariety just sketched between "vertical" and "horizontal" space 
in science and technology is not haphazard and inconsequential in the details 
adduced. It also meaningfully occurs in the representational arts, especially 
painting; and there I can point to  a n  art book wholly devoted to this subject 
matter for an  implied corroboration of my out~ook. '~ '  Havingstated my views 
before," I will here only hint at  the high points, and quote passages from two 
books not previously cited. The Riemann of modern painting is Paul Cezanne, 
and our first quotation is as follows: 
it was necessary t o  abandon  (as  CC/anne hdd done)  the  postulates of Euc l~dean  geometry. 
This lnvolvcd the ddoptlon of R i e m a n n i  topolog~cdl  schemas. schemds whlch C C ~ a n n e  
had i n t u ~ t ~ v e l y  111on  In his andlys~s  of t he  phenomenon of extension in the vis~ble  world. 
The  s~gniflcance of t h ~ s  orientation can best be grasped if we bear In m ~ n d  the fact that,  a s  
agalnst Euclidean geometry based on  the notion of d~ \ t ance .  R i e m a n n i  topology. based 
on  surlaces and elastic curves, tended t o  show that all funddmental re ldt~ons  can be 
expressed wlthout recourse to  any  Instrument of measurement. Since mat ter ls  extensible 
and dlstortable. a circle can become a n  e l l~pse  o r  a sphere  a convex surface wlthout the 
loss. In either case, of its initla1 qua l~ t i c s  Ruling out the  not lonsof  rlgldlty, right angles. 
strdight lines and  d ~ s t a n c e  (hence of projectlvc coordinate\),  this topology dedls wlth 
forms that can be man~pu la t ed  and  reshaped a t  will. TRI\ cxpl;llns why the many ver\lons 
of filonfo~tic. Sortlr~- Vrc ro11a differ from each other  far more than all the repllcas and  
variants of a classical "Adoration of the Mag1 "" 
The second quotation is from a book by Kurt Badt: 
CC/dnne d ~ d  not plan spacc as a n  empty shell Into whlch he later imported objects. and  
placed them in a certaln r e l a t l o n ~ h ~ p  to  edch other,  expressed through diminlshlng s u e .  
diminishing cldrity and  c h a n g ~ n g  color, on  the contrary, h ~ s  essential method of repro- 
ducing space wd\ to show solids ds convex. '15 detachcd and separate f rom each other o r  
as  par t~dl ly  covering each other. ~n otherwords  by maklng the plas t ic~tpof  things manlfest 
everywhere. and by m a k ~ n g  them o\er ldp '' 
This sentence of Badt's is reminiscent of the description of a locally Euclidean 
manifold, which is given by overlapping neighborhoods or by adjoining 
(convex) polyhedral simplices. 
The "flatland" that is contrapuntal to Cbanne 's  "plateau," together with 
what is built on the flatland, is the land of Picasso thecubist and much of what 
followed after him, Picasso's flattest production being his "Guernica."There 
is even a counterpart to Georg Cantor, creator of the point set; it is not of the  
same intellectual dimension, but a counterpart: Georges Seurat and his 
pointillism. 
A flattening-out also took place in the geometry stimulated by Bolyai- 
Lobachevsky. In Euclid, and still very much in BoIyai-Lobachevsky, points, 
lines, and planes were conceived and defined intuitively, and linked up by two 
kinds of axioms: geometrical postulates, and general "common notions." In 
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1900 David Hilbert, in a landmark book, Foitr7dution o/ Geon7ett:1,, "de- 
intuitivized" the setting. Points, lines, and planes were not defined descriptively 
at all, but simply "posited" and linked up by a single kind of axiom from 
which all relations between them were deductively obtained." 
After Hilbert, Ernst Zermelo even flattened out the hierarchical relation 
between a general aggregate and its elements. Aggregates and their elements 
became one family of objects, but with a formalized binary relation between 
them, a E h, read: u is an element of h, subject to suitable assumptions. 
Finally, during the last years of the (extended) nineteenth century, the 
linguo-philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his fiuc,tur~r.s (logi<*o-/>hilosop/?ic.us), 
brought together the flattened spaces of (Riemann-) Cantor and (Bolyai- 
Lobachevsky-) Hilbert in a "logical space" of his own. It is a congeries of 
logical entities like "facts," "atomic facts," "states of affairs," "propositions," 
etc., and serves as a (mathematico-) ontological background space to a 
metaphysical "space" or "universe" of reality. The internal contrasts in this 
construction are comparable to  those in a contemporary museum exhibiting 
paintings on the flattest of background spaces side-by-side with huge 
sculptures bulging and thrusting out in all directions. 
The Edwardian Era, also called the Belle Epogue, was a matrix of such 
contrasts, as set down in studies on history of art  and culture, and also in 
Barbara Tuchman's P~OLIC/  T O M ' E ~  and similar works. 
5. ATOMS. CONTINUITY 
Atoms and Continuity are conceptions from natural philosophy that are 
thoroughly Greek, pre-Socratic or even older. Also, Atomism was frequently 
representative of Discontinuity, especially to Aristotle, so that Atom and 
Continuity were even twin conceptions, of sorts. They were talked about 
throughout the centuries and millennia, but only the nineteenth century 
brought them to  productive life and even put them at center stage. The 
Renaissance and the Scientific Revolution had not been equal to this task. 
Atom is a Greek word (6iomos. uncuttable). Atomism was created by 
Leucippus and Democritus in the fifth century B C ,  and it has been agitating 
Western thought unceasingly since. Yet between classical antiquity and A.D. 
1800 atomism was aphoristic; after 1800 it became systematic. Before 1800 it 
was mostly "talk"; immediately after 1800 it became "fact." Hardly anything 
that was said between Democritus' time and 1800 was more arresting than 
what had been said by Democritus himself. 
What Democritus said was not just that matter is granulated, which is a 
trivial observation, o r  even that matter is not always infinitely subdivisible, 
which even Aristotle, an opponent of atomism, apparently admitted," but 
that (i) matter consists of microscopic, that is imperceptible, particles, which 
(ii) are separated by a void between them, the existence of the void being just 
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as much a part of the assertion as that of the atoms. Furthermore, (iii) the 
particles are constantly in motion, (iv) all physical events are some kind of 
"interactions*' between the atoms across the void, and (v) different inter- 
actions come about by the fact that different atoms have different structural 
features that dovetail in different combinations. 
These postulates, which are also postulates of the basic physical science of 
today, have been talked about incessantly since Democritus; but only the 
nineteenth century, starting immediately after 1800, began to implement 
them by specific statements which can be adduced in a college textbook of 
today. 
The significance of Atomism was recogni~ed by Aristotle even as he 
steadfastly opposed it (mainly because he "abhorred" its void). He couched 
his opposition in terms of the highest respect. After Aristotle, the philosophical 
system of Epicurus, which had a n  ethical leitmotif and a social orientation, 
was built around a physical doctrine of atomism that was obviously derived 
from Democritus, even if, as tradition has it, Epicurus emphatically denied 
this and claimed the originality of its philosophical creation for himself. After 
Epicurus, Lucretius saw fit poetically to enshrine the atomism of Epicurus in 
his De I . P I . L ~ H ~  natura, thereby making it immortal." 
In the Middle Ages, Islamic philosophy at  its height permeated its theo- 
logical doctrine of the Kalam with a far-reaching atomism, mostly though 
not exclusively of Hellenic origin."   he Latin MiddIe Ages also speculated on 
versions of atomism whose objects may have been compounds of the "hard" 
atoms of Democritus and Epicurus with a "softer" kind of "natural minima" 
perhaps descended from Aristotle. Giordano Bruno, in the second half of the 
sixteenth century, also propagated a kind of atomism of little scientific value, 
harking back t o  medieval conceptions. In the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries the mechanical theory of a finite system of masses suggested an  
atomistic outlook on theconstitution of matter. Philosophically, a systematic 
elaboration of this outlook was produced in the second half oftheeighteenth 
century by R. G. Boscovitch; it was of no serious consequence to  science, but 
is prized by some philosophers. Also, in the seventeenth century, Father 
Pierre Gassendi fused a staunch belief in traditional atomism with a kind of 
Radical Liberalism to such an  extent that  victorious Communists of the 
twentieth century canonized Gassendi to  Early Sainthood of Marxism. Rent  
Descartes, however, proclaimed a doctrine of the constitution of matter that 
has no relation to  atomism a t  all. 
All this discussion of early theories of atomism becomes quaint, anti- 
quarian, and nostalgic when compared to what happened after 1800. First, 
the classical theory of chemical compounds was put on a satisfactory basis 
by the introduction of the twin concepts of atom and molecule, with Dalton, 
Avogadro, and Prout in the lead, a molecule being defined as a compound of 
atoms of the same or  different elements. This entire development culminated 
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in the Mendeleev table of 1868, and it is noteworthy that already in 1815 
William Prout surmised that all elements are built up of hydrogen. 
Second, the theory of electrolysis, as developed by Galvani, Volta, Davy, 
Faraday, etc., led to the introduction of ions, that is, electrically charged 
atoms, called cations if the charge is positive and anions if the charge is 
negative. After that, towards the end of the century a pure indivisible unit of 
negative electrical charge, called the electron, began to take shape in scientific 
thinking, and at the very end of the century, in November 1900, Max Planck 
presented his "quantum" of energy. What followed is the subject matter of 
Part 11 of this book. 
That was not all. There was still a further atomistic conception, one that 
was nearest to Democritus' own, and it is the subject matter of the theory of 
statistical mechanics, or, alternately, of the Kinetic Theory of Gases, two 
theories that are closely related even if not quite synonymous. This theory is 
a powerful mathematical paradigm for the study of gaseous and similar 
matter, which can be viewed as a large assemblage of atomlike particles that 
move with uniform velocity in all possible directions, collide with each other, 
and are reflected from walls of containers. Except for a solitary anticipation 
in the eighteenth century by Daniel Bernoulli, the theory is entirely a creation 
of the nineteenth century. 
Einstein's "juvenilia" were a rediscovery of the elements of this theory on 
his own. 
We now turn to continuity. 
Continuity is one of the oldest categories of knowledge, perhaps as  old as 
rationality itself. It is basic, sprawling, and all-pervading. A form of continuity, 
under one name o r  another, occurs in mythology and theology, history and 
philosophy, science and mathematics, psychology and anthropology. 
Without continuity there can be no awareness of one's inner self or outer 
setting, or of the all-connecting sensation of time. The Greeks somehow knew 
all this very earIy. They had a standard word for it (.~jnechi.s), which was 
firmly planted in the language and was dominant over occasional synonyms. 
The word occurs in Homer, and already there it shows signs of becoming an 
abstract n ~ t i o n . ' ~  
Continuity occurs in our present-day ordinary dictionary meaning in the 
ontological poem by Parmenides and, similarly, in the company of related 
terms, in Aristotle's search for a quantitative paradigm for space and time in 
the second half of his Phjait,.~. But it does not occur an j*~ lhe re  in the corpus 
of Greek professional mathematica1 writing in an  intended technical mathe- 
matical meaning like that of today (the "today" beginning with the early 
nineteenth century). 
If it were not for the Eudoxian theory of proportions, which in its beautiful 
clumsiness is a substitute for certainaspects of continuity, I would pronounce 
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that Greek mathematics was a mathematics without space and without 
continuity either. 
Between antiquity and 1800, Kepler introduced into the theory of conics a 
Law of Continuity, named by him the Law of Analogy, which was later 
greatly elaborated by Poncelet in the nineteenth century. Leibniz proposed 
for all of natural philosophy, not only for mathematics, a Law of Continuity 
under this express name, which the American philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce in the nineteenth century tried, but failed, to duplicate into a much 
more ambitious law of Sjlnec.hi.~n~. And Newton took recourse to a version 
of continuity in characterizing absolute time as flowing equably (Latin: 
aequahili~et.) without relation to  anything external. But when the great 
mathematicians of the eighteenth century tried to give a specific definition for 
a continuous mathematical function, they flapped about badly. 
In the first half of the nineteenth century Cauchy inaugurated a definition 
of a continuous function that is still in use in beginners'college texts; and in 
the second half of the century Dedekind and Cantor finally gave a satisfactory 
characterization of the linear continuum that Aristotle, to his eternal glory, 
was passionately searching for. After that, the newly constituted discipline of 
topology took over. Soon after World War I-that is, at the proper beginning 
of the twentieth century-it came up with a definition of a continuous 
function that is "the real thing," however premature it is even today t o  tax the 
average freshman with it. 
And if our freshman, coming t o  college full of hopeful expectation, is 
disenchanted with the technical dryness of thedefinition of continuity offered 
to him, then let him consider that this is the only definition of it there is in the 
wide world of knowledge; or rather that mathematics is the only segment of 
human knowledge in which a definition of continuity can be rigorously 
formulated at all. Also, in mathematical contexts continuity is sharply dis- 
tinguished from neighboring concepts like uniformity, steadiness, constancy, 
etc., all of which have, in mathematical contexts, definitions of their own. 
Outside of mathematics, however, in vast reaches of applications, continuity 
is ambiguously conceived and loosely applied, and mergers, fusions, and 
crossings with neighboring concepts are unavoidable and perplexing. 
T o  restate my thesis: mathematics is the only academic discipline in which 
the conception of continuity can be called upon to  give a rigorous account of 
itself, and in which it is being bridled, mastered, and made "rationally" 
operative. 
6. DISCONTINUITY VERSUS CONTINUITY 
In virtually all areas of knowledge, Western intellection since 1800 has 
been active against the background of a multifaceted contrariety between 
Continuity and Discontinuity, with the nineteenth century tending, in varying 
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degrees, t o  favor continuity over discontinuity, and the twentieth century 
tending toward neutrality. For  mathematics I have sketched the course of the 
contest in a previous essay in these studies;" for physics the contrariety will 
be accounted for in the second half of Part  11; in the present section we will 
cast brief looks, really brief ones, into other parts of the landscape of knowledge. 
In the social sciences and humanities the preference for continuity amounted 
to a veritable discovery of continuity. This was closely allied to a discovery of 
the version of time in the course of which developments evolve continuous1y 
and in which "everything there is has a history," as will be substantiated in the 
next section. But even in science the bias towards continuity was unmistakable. 
Since Newton and Huygens there had been a debate over whether light is 
corpuscular (discrete) or undulatory (continuous). In the very beginning of the 
nineteenth century, Thomas Young, for whatever objective reason, decreed it 
to be continuous (only), and so it remained virtually till 1905, the year of a 
crucial paper by Einstein. Similarly, in electromagnetism, "field" theories tried 
to smother "particle" (that is, electron) theories out of existence for the major 
part of the century. 
Chemistry, for all its devotion to atoms and molecules, accepted the fiction 
of thermodynamics, that for many "macroscopic" statements, a continuous 
distribution of masses is appropriate. The century developed the theory of 
mechanics of continuous media in various states of aggregation, and in standard 
mathematical paradigms mechanical matter was not only distributed continu- 
ously, but even had a finite density point-by-point. Not only was the true 
atomistic composition of matter ignored, but Lord Kelvin even tried to 
envisage single atoms in the form of continuously spread-out hydrodynamical 
vortices of a kind conceived by Helmholtz. The resulting "vortex-atoms" 
turned out to be something of an embarrassment, and they have virtually been 
banished from present-day textbooks. Even historical surveys by professiona1 
physicists mention them only reluctantly. But there is no reason to be quite so 
bashful about it; that is the way the nineteenth century functioned. 
Even a physicist of the stature of Helmholtz was not able to be even-handed 
in the debate between Discrete and Continuous. He pioneered in the discovery, 
for which he is justly famous, that physiologically theear is "attuned" to receive 
only a discrete set of tones, but he showed a proclivity for the presumption that 
acoustics is a theory of waves, that is a fieId theory, without bestowing on the 
tone levels the same theoretical importance. 
In the geology and biology of the nineteenth century, the doctrine of 
(historical) evolution not only asserted that various states of development were 
following upon each other in a chronological succession, but also that the entire 
process was, and has been, a continuous one. The Continuity of geology and 
biology is hard to define; it has many facets and connotations, and it goes under 
various names. It is frequently called "uniformity," and the affirmation of it is 
the presumption of "uniformitarianism." The notion of uniformitarianism is 
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perplexingly difficult to define, or to apply, or both. Also, sometimes, but only 
sometimes, it is meant to be the antithesis to "catastrophism," but the descrip- 
tions of uniformitarianism d o  not necessarily suggest this opposition. It is even 
difficult to make out, unequivocally, whether the requirement of uniformitar- 
ianism is an internal part of the doctrine of organic evolution, that is, inseparable 
from "organicity,""' or  something externally superimposed on it. In spite of 
all such difficulties, of which the nineteenth century was well aware, unifor- 
mitarianism won out, and the twentieth century is doggedly holding on to it. 
As I stated in the introduction, Immanuel Velikovsky, a very knowledgeable 
outsider, capitalized on  these difficulties in his best-seIIer Worlds in Collision. 
The professionals were enraged; they have not yet forgiven him for bringing 
the problem so crudely into the open, and apparently d o  not intend to. 
In social science, a deep-seated presumption of continuity, from which the 
nineteenth century never quite emancipated itself, was the doctrine of 
Francis Bacon, from the early seventeenth century, that all science advances 
gradually and unerringly from observation to experimentation to theoretiza- 
tion, and that there are ways in science of deciding between right and wrong 
in such a manner that an  experimenting o r  observing scientist may collect 
his facts indubitably "objectively" before forming a theoretical opinion of 
their meaning. The twentiethcentury has been reacting quite militantly to  this 
doctrine. Alexandre KoyrC, for instance, opposed it almost to  a fault. 
The presumption of continuity was, and is, closely linked to a presumption 
of inevitable progress. R.  G. Collingwood quotes the following absurdity 
from a n  1880 book, The Nineteenrh Cenruiy,-A Hisrory, by a certain Robert 
Mackenzie: 
Human history is a record of progress -a record of accumulating knowledge and Increasing 
wisdom, of continual advancement from a lower to a higher platform of intelligence and 
well-being Each generation passes on to  the next the treasures w h ~ c h  it inherited, benefi- 
cially modified by its own experience, enlarged by the fruits of all the victories which itself 
has gained The rate of this p rog res~  . . is ~rregular and even fitful. . but the stagnation is 
only apparent. . . . The nineteenth century has witnessed progress rapid beyond all precedent, 
for it has witnessed the overthrow of the barriers which prevented progress Despotism 
thwarts and frustrates the forces by w h ~ c h  providence has provided for the progress of man: 
liberty secures for these forces their natural scope and exercise . . The growth of man's 
well-being, rescued from the mischievous tampering of self-willed princes, is left now to  the  
beneficrent regulatron of great providential laws " 
A subtler form of continuity, which I have termed "continuism,"" assumes 
that any event of today is indeed a reaction to  a n  event that must have taken 
place yesterday, but that the reaction may also be a negative one. Today's 
event may concur with yesterday's event and carry it forward, o r  it may 
disagree with it, and oppose it with something different. Continuism can be 
tedious if overdone or  practiced lopsidedly. This applies to some extent to 
the work of the eminent historian of science Pierre Duhem in the  waning 
nineteenth century. He was quite prolific, and even after he died in 1916 at 
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the age of 55, his wife published five more volumes of his S I ~ S ~ B I J I E  C/U moncle. 
He was mainly a medievalist participating in the Great Rehabilitation of the 
Middle Ages that had been vigorously inaugurated by the nineteenth century 
and that has become a large-scale academic industry in the twentieth century. 
As I said before, Duhem 
forges what seems to be a n  unbroken cham of human I~nks,  from Thales to  Galileo, clear 
across the entlre Middle Ages, w~thout  omlttlng a single decade, or  even a s~ngle year of 
them. He does not naively whiten out all the darknesses of the Middle Ages, but to Duhem 
they only indicate a certain lowering of the level of intellectuality, and not a chasmal 
rupture in the substance of the flooring." 
Duhem's intellectual commitment to continuism barred him from carrying a 
historical accounting of events in the Middle Ages beyond the axis from 
Copernicus to Kepler and Galileo. As I have been maintaining in previous 
essays, the eruption of Analysis in the era of Kepler constituted a large-scale 
discontinuity and a great divide in the unfolding of mathematics, with 
consequences in the various areas of knowledge, scientific and other. No 
continuist narration of actions and reactions can account for it. Even in the 
circumscribed field of Italian Renaissance philosophy there was a sudden 
change of direction in the middle of the sixteenth century that cannot be 
e ~ ~ ~ a i n e d . ' '  
It is a truism that the Greek historian Herodotus was rather episodic in his 
presentation of political developments, whereas his successor Thucydides was 
powerfully continuist (in a good sense) in linkingcause and effect in the arena 
of politics. Also Herodotus was rather expansive in his geographical, social, 
and related asides, whereas Thucydides was almost single-mindedly intent 
on unfolding his poIitica1 narration. In view of this, the outgoing nineteenth 
century tended condescendingly to reduce Herodotus to  the standing of a 
mere story-teller, with the unconcealed suspicion that most of his stories are 
only fables anyway; some bold historians might even have liked to read 
Herodotus out of the guild of historians because of his many asides, and to  
enthrone Thucydides as  the Father of History instead. But in the twentieth 
century archeology has been triumphantly vindicating the fables of Herodotus; 
and the linking up of geographic, economic, and social circumstances with 
political developments has become a new trend. 
The nineteenth century exegete of ancient literary texts was prone--even 
at his best-to "emend," "rearrange," or "reinterpret" the statements of the 
texts, in order to arrive at more "continuous" and more "natural," and thus 
more probable, courses of developments than those offered by the texts as they 
are. Frequently the twentieth century finds good causes for rejecting o r  at least 
modifying the well-meant removal of such discontinuities. 
For instance, the book Le\jitic.us of the Old Testament is a large colIection 
of elaborate priestly ordinances, alien to our  sensibility, composed ina  highly 
formalized priestly lingo, which, as everybody agrees, was formed rather late, 
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about the time, say, of Ezekiel, the last of the great prophets. But Leviticus 
also insists that these ordinances were handed down to Moses quite early in 
the history of Israel, at the Sinaitic revelation. Enlightened scholars of the 
nineteenth century were inclined to  take the reference to Moses very lightly 
and to conclude that not only the language but also the substance of the 
so-called Priestly Code was a late construction of post-Exilic times. But in 
the twentieth century William Foxwell Albright, an eminent American 
student of the Old Testament, has devoted many studies t o  the proposition 
that the substance of the Priestly Code is indeed as ancient as the Bible main- 
tains, going back to  early stages of the communal organization of the tribes 
of ~srael ,"  
Finally, I have to  dwell briefly o n  the fact that the nineteenth century was 
also a century that proposed the most rigid scientific determinism ever 
claimed. It is the statement of Laplace that any person possessing complete 
knowledge of the state of the universe a t  any one given moment would be able 
to predict the state of the universe for all times to  come.'"here is nothing 
more intolerant of discontinuities than this approach; and we will find in 
Part I 1  that the spirit of this intolerance was still operative in Einstein's 
rejection of the Bohr-Born-Heisenberg world-picture of twentieth century 
physics. 
May I state that there was an  equally intolerant soc'ial determinism and 
that it was most eloquently expressed in the tenets of Karl Marx and Marxism. 
However revolutionary Karl Marx's expectations may have been, according 
to his doctrine the revolution between the classes was nevertheless historically 
inevitable, and the outcome was firmly predetermined. Dialectical Materialism 
is a fundamentally historical conception of society and even of nature. "Accord- 
ing to this conception," said Engels towards the end of the nineteenth century, 
"Socialism was no longer an accidental discovery of this or that ingenious brain, 
but the necessary outcome of the struggle between historically developed 
cla~ses."'~ This belief in social determinism did not win out without a struggle. 
An opposite to it, namely social indeterminism, was embodied in Proudhon's 
Anarchism, and Marx had to strain all his intellectual resources to combat it." 
7. EVERYTHING HAS A HISTORY 
The nineteenth century hardly initiated the writing of history of or in any 
academic field, but it intensified it t o  an  unprecedented degree in every field. 
In mathematics, in the latter half of the nineteenth century Moritz Cantor 
wrote a history that remains fundamental. In 1840, M. Chasles wrote a history 
of geometry: I. Todhunter wrote first a history of probability (1865), then a 
history of Mathematical Theories of Attraction a n d  Figure of Earth from 
N e ~ l t o n  to Laplace (1873), and then a history of the Theory of Elasticitj~~fiom 
Galileo to the Present (1893). 
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Astronomy is, next to  mathematics, the oldest "exact" science there is, yet 
histories of it had been very rare and sparse. As if to  make up for this, the 
nineteenth century produced a spate of them. 
At the beginning of the century, J .  B. Delambre wrote an indispensable 
history of astronomy in six volumes (1817-1827). About the same time, 
P. S. Laplace wrote a somewhat popular Pr6c.1~ de I'Historie c/e llbstronomie 
(1 82 I), and even before that J .  S. Bailly composed an  even more popular one 
in several volumes ( 1775- 1782). 
In medicine, in contrast to astronomy, a notable historical work had 
already been done in 1696 by the Swiss physician Daniel Leclerc. But a true 
beginning was made only around 1800 with a multivolume work by Kurt 
Polykarp Sprengel; of this work the twentieth-century historian of medicine 
Fielding H. Garrison said that it "has been the great source book for facts and 
footnotes for all subsequent investigators." In 1790 a journal in the history of 
medicine was begun under the title Archi\) fuer die Geschichte der Arznevkunde. 
A large-scale history of physics was compiled in 1860 by F. Rosenberger. 
It had been preceded in 1838 by a history of optics by S.  Wilde, and even 
much earlier by histories of electricity (1770) and of light (1771) by Joseph 
Priestley. In chemistry two fundamental works by H. Koppand by F. Hoefer 
were published in the 1840s. In geology, a systematic full-scale history came 
only in 1899, and it was the Geschichte tier. Geologie by K .  A. Zittel. That 
such a book should appear relatively late is surprising, seeing that geology in 
the nineteenth century had an intrinsic historical orientation from the outset. 
Special mention should be made of two works that, in their separate ways, 
were most influential. The many-sided Cambridge don William Whewell 
produced in 1837 a his to^:^' ofrl7e Inductive Sciences, which in a sense created 
the genre of "History of Science" in our present-day sense. The second work 
appeared in the last decades of the Victorian era, a "critical" history of 
mechanics by Ernst Mach, which greatly enhanced the role of mechanics 
within physics as a whole. Above all, this was Einstein's lifelong vade-mecum 
in matters philosophical. His self-indoctrination with the philosophy of 
Mach may have created the intellectual barrier that kept Einstein from 
entering the twentieth century of physics during the long second half of his 
career. 
In the history of law, there appeared relatively early in the century two 
compendious works from Germany, one on German law by Karl Friedrich 
Eichhorn (Deutsche Staats- und Rerhtsgeschichte, 4 volumes, 1808-1823), 
and another on Roman law, by Friedrich Karl von Savigny (Geschichte des 
Ro?nischen Rechts iin Mittelalter, 6 volumes, 18 15-1 83 1). They were part of 
the rehabilitation of the Middle Ages mentioned in theprecedingsection, and 
of a growing estimation, and sometimes overestimation, of medieval achieve- 
ments. For many scholars, and even generations of scholars, to  vindicate the 
Middle Ages became, and continues to  be, a consummation devoutly to be 
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wished. Many books on aspects of life in the Middle Ages began to sound 
like by-lines of contemporary American correspondents abroad. Many books 
on popular themes can be written in this way, the story of AbClard and HClo'ise 
being probably the most popular. 
Present-day theories of automation, communication, and information 
involve abstract situations of linguistics, and such situations began to be shaped 
in the nineteenth century within its evolutionary outlooks. For instance, the 
introductory paragraph of a leading work on the The Di.sc0ver.1, of Langttage 
runs thus: 
Until the close of the e~ghteenth century, European l~ngulst~c s lence had advanced but 
llttle beyond the knowledge of l~nguist~cs achieved by the Greeks and Romans I t  IS true 
that l~ttle by lrttle some of the elements had appeared whlch were necessary for develop- 
ment beyond the l~mitations and errors of the ancients, but as yet they had no Influence. 
The so11 was prepared. but it was not until the n~neteenth century that growth was dest~ned 
to sprlng from ~t . '"  
This statement exaggerates in one respect. Another book on linguistics, a 
recent one, adduces a n  overwhelming amount of evidence for successful 
linguistic studies even before the beginning of the nineteenth century.""~hus,  
an  impressive achievement was the 1770 publication by J .  Sajnovics of a 
Proof that the Languages o f  the Hungarians and the Lapps Are One and the 
Sanie, followed in 1799 by a study of S. Gyarmathi-apparently a much more 
systematic one-which deals with "the historical kinship of Hungarian and 
~ i n n i s h . " ~ '  Already Leibniz, in the.first half of the eighteenth century, "was 
one of the first to posit historical relations between Finnish and ~ u n ~ a r i a n . " "  
What definitely belong to  the nineteenth century are the highly spectacular 
feats of deciphering hieroglyphs and cuneiform writing. And if the nineteenth 
century did not succeed in reading Etruscan inscriptions, then it need not be 
ashamed of itself, because the twentieth century has not much advanced in 
this task either. 
Books on the history of linguistics hardly mention feats that astound the 
impressionable layman. What they count mostly as the truly innovatory and 
unprecedented achievement of the nineteenth century is the emergence and 
systematic pursuit of i,ot??pdrarive grammar, which officially began in the late 
eighteenth century with a famous statement by Sir William Jones, a British 
judge in India. Jones had studied a wide variety of languages, and in 1786 he 
delivered his famous Third Anni~lersay~ Discourse, which reads in part: 
The Sanskrit language, whatever be 11s a n t ~ q u ~ t y ,  is of a wonderful structure, more perfect 
than the Greek, more coplous than the L a t ~ n ,  and moreexquis~tely refined than e~ther. yet 
bearlng to both of them a strongeraffinlty, both In the roots of verbs and in the forms of 
grammar. than could possibly have been produced by acc~dent, so strong Indeed. that no 
ph~lologer could exarnlne them all three, wlthout believing them to have sprung from 
some common source, whlch. perhaps, no longer exists. There IS a slmllarreason, though 
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no t  qulte s o  forcible, for  supposing that  both the  Gothic  and the  Celtlc, though blended 
with a very different idlom, had the  same origin with the Sanskrit ,  and  the  Old Persian 
might be added to  the same family." 
The expression "comparative grammar" was coined in 1808 in Friedrich 
von Schlegel's Uhrr (lie S/>~.ac.he ~ltwl Wershelf c/er Inzlpr (On the Language 
and Wisdom of the Hindus), with the following send-off: "Comparative 
grammar will give us entirely new information on the genealogy of languages, 
in exactly the same way in which comparativeanatomy has thrown light upon 
natural history.""" The ensuing findings about genealogical proximities and 
distances between languages must have been thrilling to  contemporaries, even 
if the twentieth century has become blasit about such statements. But even 
today, word-compounds like Indo-European and Finno-Ugric speak volumes 
of history; and even today it can be astonishing to hear that Old Norse and 
Old Albanian are much more consanguineous than, say, Hebrew and Greek, 
even if central passages in the Gospels bear tell-tale marks of being transla- 
tions from Hebrew-Aramaic originals. 
In very few cases of historically oriented studies has there been such a 
difference in knowledge between A.D 1800 and A D 1900 as in the under- 
standing of the rise, spread,and distribution of spoken and written languages, 
especially the written. The subsequent developments in the twentieth century 
seem to concentrate on spoken language and languages, as against the u-ritten 
ones. This accords with the fact that until the nineteenth century the study of 
linguis~ics was preponderantly historical, in  the twentieth century it is 
historical and analytical in equal measure. 
Next, the pedagogy (this is a formal name for education) of today is laced 
with psychology. This link was forged systematically in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century by the all-purpose philosopher Johann Friedrich 
Herbart, even before psychology was an  academic field in its own right, 
independent of philosophy. Herbart was not only also a psychologist, as most 
philosophers at the time still were automatically, but he was also a lifelong 
devotee of pedagogy, which he included in his psychology, thus making 
pedagogy into a kind of applied psychology. He was successful in this although 
the psychology current at his time was not sufficiently articulated to be 
adequate for the purpose.J5 It was Herbart who became the founder of 
"scientific" pedagogy-albeit by turning it into an applied psychology in a 
sense-and not the celebrated Pestalozzi, his forerunner, for whom the 
theoretical basis of education consisted of the maxim that "Love in the class- 
room conquers all." A recent history of education fondly remembers Herbart 
thus: 
The great advance made by Herbart and rts importance can hardly be exaggerated-1s 
that he based h ~ s  e d u c a t ~ o n a l v ~ e w s o n  a new and  fully worked ou t  psychology. He is there- 
fore the forcrunncrof the whole subsequent school of cducd t~ona l  reformer5 who had held 
that their f ~ r s t  requirement was  an  lndcpcndent study of t h e  workings of the human  
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m ~ n d .  . . F o r  the first t ime an  educa t~ona l  prophet saw the necessity of de r~v ing  his 
t heo r~es  from a coherent psychology "" 
In psychology proper, Herbart jumped ahead of the twentieth century and 
conceived of "thresholds of consciousness," "inhibitions," and "repressions." 
His inhibitions and repressions referred only to ideas and not yet to fearsand 
desires; even so, his adumbrations were enough to secure for him several 
mentions in the standard biography of Sigmund ~ r e u d . "  By searching 
diligently enough, one could probably find that any proposition by Herbart 
had been conceived before him, by Kant, Leibniz, Locke, Aquinas, Aristotle, 
and so  forth. But this finding would be of no consequence: every one of 
Freud's major maxims had once been somebody's aphorism long before 
Freud. Also, Herbart's notions were sufficiently free from metaphysical 
encumbrances to be noticed by Freud, whereas previous ideas were very much 
a part of the philosophical framework. 
Finally, the everyday vocabulary of social science-though not all of it-is 
also a creation of the nineteenth century. 
Aristotle even pioneered in saying that man is a "political animal." But the 
Greeks did not understand our  concept of "state," only something like "the 
totality of the citizenry." The Greeks could not have made the pronounce- 
ment that "the state will wither away." Our  concept of state began with 
Machiavelli. 
The Greeks did not have our notion of a "constitution,"only of something 
in the nature of "the totality of laws."They could not have said that something 
is "unconstitutional,"only that it is unlawful or  illegal. Nor did they have our  
conception of "international law." In the Roman Empire, conceptions like 
"cosmopolitanism" and "international law" would have referred to the 
Roman Empire in its total extent, and perhaps also to its spheres of influence, 
but not to something truly worldwide. Such conceptions emerged only in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century. 
Next, the nineteenth century created the conception of socialism. Although 
the term occurs in print as early as 1803. it took several decades before it 
became knowingly associated with reforms of social order and assertions of 
human rights.JX Soon afterwards the term ar.larc~h,1~was consciousIy created by 
Proudhon, around 1840, and anarchism was apparently from the first in- 
tended to be opposed to socialism. Communism, however, not only a s  a 
principle of joint property, but even as a way of life, was already fully known 
to the Greeks. Plato advocated it in his Repzlhlic., but with a very pronounced 
authoritarian slant; nothing corresponding to  our present-day "leftish" 
notion of civil rights was involved. 
But the slogan of "the exploitation of man by manWwas coined in the early 
nineteenth century; it was created, well before Marx, by Saint-Armand 
Bazard (1791-1832)." ~ a r x  institutionalized the term and  concept of 
Alienation; but it had been used, earlier in the nineteenth century, by Hegel. 
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"Sociologie" was coined in 1839 by Comte. It was apparently intended to 
replace in Comte's usage the earlier expression "ph~ysiquesociale," which had 
been created by Henri de Saint-Simon f 1760-1823), then used in 1835 in a 
book title by A. Quetelet, the creator of the "average man" (homme ~no,iten), 
and also used by Comte himself. In English, "sociology" began to be used in 
book titles in the 1870s both in Great Britain and the United States. In the 
1890s, Chicago University may have had the first professor of sociology so 
titled. 
Except for the academ~c fteld of Pol~ttcs, ~f Soctology IS not just an objective representa- 
tlon of soc~al  facts. but a program of pry~ng Into the meanings of soc~al  facts, tf ~t 1s notjust 
the history of ethtcal systems, of cultic practtces. of mythological beltefs. etc.. but an 
attempt and effort to ftnd systemattc technlque5 for Interpreting cthtcal systcm5, culttc 
practices. mytholog~cal beltefs. etc., then ioctology hds begun around and after 1800. and 
IS one more of the really great achtevements of the century "' 
8. PESSIMISTS 
The nineteenth century had pessimists and prophets of doom. S o  did 
earlier centuries. But in the nineteenth century they were radically different, a 
new breed. 
Even before the century began, in 1792, Thomas Robert Malthus, a parson 
among many, warned mankind that it will starve itself out of food unless it 
controls the size of its population. The leading aspects and arguments of the 
Malthusian Principle may have been worked out by various population- 
economists long before ~ a l t h u s . "  But it was Malthus who caught the attention 
of the public, by casting a pall that refuses to dissipate. In fact, the world 
seems to be running out not only of food, but of natural resources altogether. 
Karl Marx, being a humorless optimist and eschatologist, and unrelenting 
when in opposition, hated Malthus, and, as was his wont in intellectual 
confrontations, heaped scorn on him. T o  Marx, the proletariat was fated to 
win, albeit by violence; a betterment of the world was sure to  come. No 
Malthus would change that. 
Next, in the middle of the nineteenth century, culminating in 1865, the 
thermodynamicist Rudolf Clausius created his second law of thermodynamics 
and applied it to the universe as a whole. The outcome was that the available 
energy of the universe is unceasingly transforming itself into uncreative 
uniform heat, thus leading the universe inexorably to a "heat death, in which 
the world shall be reduced to  one vast temperature equilibrium in which 
nothing really new ever happens. There will be nothing left but a drab uni- 
formity our of which we can expect only minor and insignificant local 
fluctuations."" 
This heat death would take millions, even billions of years to come about. 
But intellectuals have been frightened by the prospect of it nonetheless. Thus 
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Henry Adams wrote "A letter to AmericanTeachers of History"about it, and 
quite recently a n  economist wrote a large economic treatise on the theme of 
the Second Law of ~ h e r m o d ~ n a m i c s . ' ~  
Clausius coined the term Pnrrop.), by which to quantify his law. It designates 
a real-valued quantity measuring, in a thermodynamic process, when it is 
completed, the extent to which the amount of heat has increased at  the 
expense of other available energy. Thus the entropy of the universe in its 
entirety is on the increase. But only for the universe in its entirety. In seIect 
parts of the universe it may on occasion decrease. Such a decrease in a part of 
the universe must be compensated for somewhere else by a n  increase at  least 
as large. In the kinetic theory of gases, itself part of so-called statistical 
mechanics, heat is generated by the "irregular" motion of microscopic 
particles. If one interprets this irregular motion as "disorder," then the 
entropy measures the degree of this disorder, the higher the entropy the 
larger the disorder. And the second law of thermodynamics states that in the 
universe as a whole, the total disorder is constantly on the increase. 
O n  the other hand, 
Llving organisms represent bystems that  a r e  highly "organ~zed." that  is, they display less 
randomness than the materials from which they a re  "built", and  ~t is thereforejurtil table 
to say that  a ( I c ~ o c ( I \ ~  in entropy 1s lnvolved In their bullding '' 
By what we have noted above, this decrease in entropy must be compensated 
for by a n  increase somewhereelse. In fact, "the small local decrease in entropy 
represented in the building of the organism is coupled with a much larger 
increase in the entropy of the universe."" 
A very discouraging consequence arises if one equates disorder with the 
"pollution" of everyday parlance. In this interpretation, the total pollution of 
the universe can only increase, and any attempt a t  clearing up a n  environment 
results in an  even worse pollution in some layer outside the given environment. 
Thus, terrestrial nuclear waste cannot be literally disposed of. At best it can be 
transported into another part of the universe, with some additional pollution 
as "transportation compensation" arising. There is one dubious theoretical 
way out. Even if one admits that entropy is constituted by disorder, it is still 
very difficult to say what "disorder" in entropy really is.'" 
Finally, a t  the end of the nineteenth century, there appeared, before the end 
of World War  I, Volume I of The Dectlinc. of rhe West, by the "prophet of 
doom" Oswald Spengler. Leaving aside Spengler's insistence on the cyclicity 
of history, but focusing on his comments on tangible phenomena, one sees 
that his analysis, whether retrodictive or  predictive, cannot be simply ignored. 
His retrodictive interpretation of differences between Greek and modern 
mathematics is most pertinent; and before 1920 he predicted for the second 
half of the twentieth century the kind of civic lawlessness and social fragmen- 
tation that we are  undergoing nowadays, 
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Malthus, Clausius, and Spengler were social o r  physical scientists. In 
between were the literary pessimists. 
Between Malthus and Clausius there was Arthur  Schopenhauer,  a 
philosopher-pessimist in the manner of Heracleitus. According to him, 
human life not only t77uj9contain more misery than happiness but this must be 
so, on philosophical grounds. There is only one progress, progress towards 
more misery.>' 
Between Clausius and Spengler there was LevTolstoy with his pessimistic- 
ally moralistic Kreufzer Sonata, and above all, Friedrich Nietzsche, a 
brooding philosopher of ambiguous outlooks, whom Spengler viewed as one 
of his two mentors (the other being Goethe). 
In the twentieth century, successor pessimists to  all the above were,among 
others, Franz Kafka, the Jean Paul Sartre of N u ~ ~ s e n ,  and the Sigmund Freud 
of Disc*ontent in Ci\~ilization. Also (and this will be a prime lesson in Part 11), 
much of what can be taken for general pessimism was "sublimated" into 
twentieth-century physics. More about this in Part I1  itself. 
9. T H E  I R R A T I O N A L  V E R S U S  T H E  R A T I O N A L  
After World War I, the anti-democratic forces in post-war Germany that 
eventually brought forth Nazism rallied intellectually under the flag of a 
contrariety of Irrationality versus Rationality. They did so from an  over- 
whelming Teutonic fear of, distrust of, contempt of, and horror of what the 
German intelligentsia, and especially the superintelligentsia, called "rationality," 
and they gave way to a headlong abandonment into and passion for what they 
called "irrationality," with a religio-mystical flavor entirely of its own. The 
despised and feared and to-be-exterminated rationality was, according to the 
Germans, a mark of Frenchmen, Jews, Freemasons, and misguided Anglo- 
Saxons for whom rationality and the profit motive were inseparable. 
A recent study by a n  expert author seems to suggest, if I interpret the 
author correctly, that Werner Heisenberg was compelled and impelled 
towards inventing his matrix mechanics in response to an all-encompassing 
"ecological" and cultural pressure for overcoming determinism, causality, 
"mechanical" rationality, etc., in favor of indeterminism, uncertainty qua 
a-causality, freedom from stifling and un-German "rationality," e t ~ . ~ '  The 
study is extremely well documented, and for my part I can only rely on 
memory of my personal experiences and impressions, having lived through 
the period in Germany already as an adult. I d o  not even have any kind of 
diaries by which to refresh my memory. 1 nevertheless venture to make some 
observations on the intellectual climate during the so-called Weimar Period 
or Weimar Culture, as the setting in Germany between World War 1 and the 
ascent of Hitler has come to  be known. 
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My first overall observation is that things were very bad, and the academic 
atmosphere in Germany was oppressive indeed, and growing more so. But I 
simply d o  not remember at  all that mathematicians and physicists and other 
scientists were the choice targets of this oppressiveness, and that they acted 
and re-acted as such. In particular, young and aspiring mathematicians and 
physicists did in no way consider themselves a s  being worse off than students 
of classics, o r  of other humanistic pursuits, or  even of German history and 
literature, than which there was nothing more sacred in the  land. Things were 
bad, but not along such a scientific/humanistic line of division. 
I d o  not mean to absolve the bearers of Weimar Cultureof their very many 
and very stubborn sins of omission and commission. I agree with the present- 
day German historian Fritz Fischer in his thesis-which he stoutly defends 
against all critics and detractors-that the World War  of 1914-1918 was 
brought about, almost inevitably, by the German bourgeoisie in all its layers, 
and foremost by its intellectuals; by uncontrollable dreams of glory of globe- 
spanning world domination, physically, materially, and also intellectually. 
And when the dreams were all shattered, most of the nation, especially the 
educated classes, and most especially the university crowds, were seeking for  
scapegoats all over the landscape, not only in political areas but also in 
intellectual ones. And a climate of oppressiveness was developed and sustained. 
All this is true. But to cap these insights by the conclusion that these move- 
ments of intellectual obfuscation were somehow responsible for the rise and 
creation of the theories of quantum mechanics and of wave mechanics does not 
sound right to me. It simply did not happen this way. 
My second general observation is that there were two very separate phe- 
nomena involving discontinuities and that they must not be conflated, as is 
sometimes regrettably done. Both are large-scale phenomena of Western 
intellectuality, both worldwide, and not necessarily of German origin, however 
much Weimar Germany may have cultivated them to excess. These several 
phenomena d o  overlap, and the Weimar intellectuals themselves did conflate 
them too. But from a historical distance of a half-century they ought to be 
kept apart  and traced to  their divers origins. 
I .  The first phenomenon, o r  movement, a most "international" one, was, 
and still is, a struggle to grasp the interrelations, differences, and (in-) 
consistencies of some seemingly related or  contrasting cognitive concepts, 
axioms, and procedures, like causality, determinism, functional (inter-) 
dependencies, mathematical certainty, statistical certainty, certainty as a limit 
of statistical probability, etc. 
This struggle may have had antecedents in antiquity and the Middle Ages, 
but it really began after the Renaissance with the British empiricists and was 
institutionalized by David Hume with his affirmation that "causality," 
whatever that may be, is a t  best "association" and nothing more "binding." 
Kant made one of philosophy's greatest efforts t o  save causality by shoring it 
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up with Apriorism. But hardly anybody believed that Kant's was thelast word 
in the matter. Even the relatively secondary question, whether and to  what 
extent causality is co-extensive with determinism, refuses to come to rest. And 
the widespread identification of causality and /o r  determinism with the 
"certainty" and "predictability" of a Newtonian mechanical point system was 
in the twentieth century almost too childish to debate, even if thundering 
superintellectuals of the Weimar Culture sometimes took this identification 
for granted, as did also, regrettably, many intellectuals of the "enlightened" 
West. 
The "experiential" or "empirical" association of Hume leads only too 
naturally to  such intellectual constructs as  Mill's inductive logic in Britain, 
and pragmatism and instrumentalism in the United States: or, at least, it 
cannot be neatly separated from them. And even the element of "probabilism" 
in the great theories of statistical mechanics and physics of the nineteenth 
century has a certain link to  it. 
In sum and in short, the profession of a-causality in the broadest sense was 
in no wise a Teutonic institution, however much the Weimar Culture may 
have pushed it to extremes. 
2. A rather different phenomenon, which the Germans had a greater share 
in creating, was the quest for "irrationality." It was more popular than the 
quest for a-causality, even though only its academic formulations by various 
Germans have become generally known. 
Of course in the heady outpouring, verbal or written, of a muddle-headed 
o r  mischievous German on the (pseudo-) intellectual war-path, the two 
phenomena, that is, irrationality and a-causality, frequently merged, but in a 
serious study today they ought to be kept apart. Furthermore, when the 
outpouring came in a solemn address, o r  an  article-to-such-a-purpose by a 
German professor, then one still must consider the difference between deliver- 
ing oneself of such a declaration o r  declarations, and actually applying the 
lesson from it in one's day-by-day routine work in the lab or classroom, or 
behind a desk with a pile of books on it. The latter application occurred much 
more rarely than so-called documentations might suggest. 
That irrationality is really something very different from a-causality in its 
main manifestations can be seen from the following statement about it by an 
expert: 
Future h~s to r l ans  will. I belleve. recognl/e ~n this p reoccupa t~on  wlth the surd element the  
governing Impulse of o u r  time, the ~lurt,lnt~ o r  Zei tge~st  which in d~fferent  gulscs has 
haunted minds a s  varlous a s  N1et7sche. Bergson. Heldegger in ph~loaophy,  J u n g  in 
psycliology. Sorel,  Pareto. Spengler rn pol l t~cal  theory, Yeats, Ldwrence. Joyce. Kafka. 
Sar t re  ~n I~tera ture ,  Plcas\o and  the surreal~sts  In painting 
The expert is E. R. Dodds, a prominent British classicist, author of the book 
The Greeks and the Irrutiot7al; the aphorism above is a footnote to his article 
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"Plato and the Irrational," which is Chapter VII in his book The Ancient 
Concept o f  Progress and Other Essays on Greek Literature and Beliefs( 1973). 
This author's own work on irrationality deals with a very special aspect of it, 
namely with its manifestations in Greek religion, but the author seems very 
knowledgeable about the conception in general. 
It is noteworthy that in Dodds's list the Germans do  not even predominate. 
The only true Germans on it are Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Spengler, because 
Jung is culturally Swiss, and this is not the same as being German. And 
among non-Germans Bergson, 1 think, was a much more pronounced and 
influential irrationalist than is sometimes conceded. I remember that around 
the time when Hitler was close to  coming to power, some "Nazi intellectuals" 
were disappointed that Bergson was a Jew, because they would have liked to 
put him into their Living Hall of Fame (he lived till 1938)." 
3. 1 also question the widespread view that anybody in the Weimar period 
who quoted something meaningful from SpengIer with approval was neces- 
sarily an  irrationalist like Spengler. This does not follow. It is wrong to posit 
that everybody during the Weimar Culture who was fascinated by Spengler 
and was carried away into quoting him was necessarily a grave-digger of this 
culture. In this sense 1 must put in a kind word for Ernst Troeltsch (1863- 
1923), who is sometimes mistaken for an  unmitigated irrationalist. Troeltsch 
is the author of the monumental work in two volumes The Social Teaching o f  
the Christian Churc~hes; of the large historiographic work Der Historismtis 
und Seine Prohletne (Tiibingen, 1922); of the still very readable article on the 
German Enlightenment, "Die Aufklarung," in Real- Encryc/opaclie .fur 
protes~antische Theologie und Kirche, Third Edition, vol. I1 (i897), pp. 225- 
241; and of some articles to  the effect that the outbreak of the (First) World 
War was due to  some kind of "breakdown of communications,"as one would 
put it today, rather than to  diabolic intent on either side. During my student 
days a t  the University of Berlin (I enrolled in the autumn of 1918) Troeltsch 
used to  give, every term, I think, a lecture two hours a week (Saturdays, 10-12, 
with a n  intermission) which bore the titIe "Introduction to Philosophy" and 
was in fact an  introduction t o  his current interests in philosophy. During one 
of the lecture hours he simply presented, in an agitated manner, a "book 
review" of volume I of Spengler. As I remember the book review, it was not a t  
all an extolling of irrationality or a-causality, but simply the exposition of a 
new approach to the "morphology of world history,"as Spengler himself had 
called the book originally. (As I heard it a t  the time, it was the publisher who 
suggested the title Decline [Untergang] of the West, simply as an  advertising 
gimmick.) It soon became mandatory to discuss Spengler endlessly. It was 
just a fashion, and as a fashion it was not nearly so widespread as had been 
twenty years before in Paris the compulsion t o  discuss Bergson. 
Also it must be taken into account that Troeltsch died relatively soonafter 
the outburst of the Spengler mania, and perhaps had he lived longer, he might 
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have had reasons and opportunities for reconsidering his stand on various 
implications of Spenglerism. 
4. One must not make too much of the fact that during the Weimar period 
mathematics and physics were taken t o  task for being intellectually too 
presumptuous and too demanding of attention, and that some mathematicians 
cringingly admitted guilt. T o  this charge I can only say that during the 
Weimar period mathematics stood generally in very high regard, and that  this 
kind of ambivalence of attitude towards mathematics is as old as academic 
mathematics itself, the word ac.a~/eternic. to be taken literally (that is, since the 
times of the Platonic Academy itself). 
In the early nineteenth century, the German N u t u r ~ h i u . s o ~ h t  (nature- 
philosophers) had a deep intellectual suspicion of mathematics. Yet, from 
around 1800 until today every great university of the West has had a great 
mathematics department. In the seventeenth century Francis Bacon, a 
paragon of modernism, was contemptuous of mathematics. But it wasa great 
century in mathematics nevertheless, and hardly any of Bacon's general 
followers echoed his attitude towards mathematics. In the thirteenth century 
Roger Bacon was a noisy advocate of mathematics, and he was so noisy about 
it that there must have been many others who were indifferent to  it or worse. 
Around 1200, Fibonacci made such a splash with his Liher abaci that a t  the 
court of Frederick the Second in Sicily he was dined and wined, figuratively 
speaking. On the other hand, the important work of Oresme and others from 
the fourteenth century was all but forgotten after 1600, and was only re- 
discovered in the nineteenth century as a part of the Great Rehabilitation of 
the Middle Ages then commencing. Ambivalence towards mathematics is as 
old as mathematics itself. 
5. Finally we come to  the suggestion that  Heisenberg's matrix mechanics, 
with the consequent uncertainty-relation, and thus the entire physics since, 
came about by a soul-anguished desire to respond to the (allegedly) all- 
pervading quests for a-causality, indeterminism, irrationality, etc. This 
suggestion is untenable. 
The matrix-mechanics was a genuine development in physics-for-physics' 
sake, and it was spawned not in Germany but in Copenhagen. Only a part of 
the German sense of exhilaration over this achievement was pride in Heisen- 
berg's being a German. And several among the leading co-architects of the 
new theory were as un-irrational as they could possibly be; nobody who ever 
met Dirac or Fermi could conceivably suspect them of allowing themselves to 
be tools in a drive towards legitimizing irrationality of any kind. Schrijdinger, 
creator of the theory of wave mechanics, although an Austrian, may have had 
some tendencies towards Teutonic irrationality; but he acknowledged a 
measure of indebtedness to Louis de Broglie, who not only is as rational as 
only a certain caste of Frenchmen can be, but also was a staunch ally of 
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Einstein in his battle to eliminate any kind of Heisenberg uncertainty o r  
indeterminacy altogether. 
It is noteworthy that Russian textbooks on quantum mechanics, especially 
on the more advanced quantum ,field theory, speak not of a Heisenberg 
"uncertainty"-relation but simply of a "Weisenberg Law," which reigns in the 
"microscopic" realm of elementary particles, and they seem to have no diffi- 
culties a t  all. That is, they seem to have no difficulties in harmonizing this with 
the "macroscopic" Marx-Engels law to the effect that in the realm of eco- 
nomics and class relations everything is deterministic, and is in fact determined 
by dialectical materialism. 
An undergraduate today is not disconcerted by the "Heisenberg Law." He 
is no  more disconcerted by the statement t h a t p  and qcannot be observed with 
h a joint precision more than - than by the statement that light of frequency 1 1  
2 7i- 
travels in units of energy hv. Both these statements assert the existence, o r  
rather presence, of certain "discontinuities" in physical nature, and our 
Zeitgeist is simply wilIing to accept them. It would be carrying things too far 
to assert that it was the Weimar Culture that mightily promoted this universal 
movement that distinguishes the twentieth century from the preceding 
nineteenth century, and that the bearers of the Weimar Culture brought this 
about from "sinister" motives too. 
10. GREATNESS OF T H E  NINETEENTH CENTURY 
I will list some noteworthy achievements from the span A.D. 1850-1870. It 
is a ribbon across the center of the extended nineteenthcentury 1800-1920, of 
the same width as the interval between the two World Wars in the twentieth 
century. 
1850s Gustav R. Kirchhoff, with the partial cooperation of 
Robert M. Bunsen, founds spectroscopy 
1850s Theodor Momrnsen, Roman Historv 
1851 Herman Melville, Moby Dick 
I854 Bernhard Riemann's lectures o n  (Riemannian) geometry, 
published posthumously 1868 
1857 Gustave Flaubert, Madame Bovary 
1859 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species 
1860 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in 
Italy 
1860 Louis Pasteur becomes "Father of Bacteriology" 
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1860 Bernhard Riemann initiates the mathematical theory of 
(dreaded) shockwaves 
1860 Gustav T. Fechner and Ernst H. Weber create the Weber- 
Fechner Law (Response = logarithm of stimulus) 
I862 Victor Hugo, Les Miserables 
1862 Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation 
1864 James Clerk Maxwell, theory of electro-magnetic radiation 
1864 Angelo Secchi begins spectroscopic analysis of sun and 
stars 
1865 Rudolf J .  E. Clausius, entropy and its Law 
1865 Friedrich J .  KekulC, ring structure of organic compounds 
(benzene ring) 
1865 Joseph Lister introduces antiseptic surgery 
1865 Gregor Mendel, Law of Inheritance 
1865- 1869 Lev Tolstoy, War and Peace 
1865-1870 Paul Ctzanne begins to exhibit 
1866 Feodor Dostoevski, Crime and Punishment 
1868 Karl Marx, Das Kapital 
1868 William Huggins uses red-shift to prove that Sirius is 
moving away from the sun 
1869 Dirnitri Mendeleev, Periodic Table 
1870 Heinrich von Stephan conceives the Universal Postal 
Union, the first permanent international organization 
[I wish I could include Verdi's Aida (1871) and, above all, Bizet's Carmen 
(1875).] 
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